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We analyse the experimental outcome of the Traveller’s Dilemma under three different  treatments - 
baseline (BT), compulsory ex post players’ meeting (CET) and voluntary ex post players’ meeting 
(VET) - to evaluate the effects of removal of anonymity (without preplay communication) in a 
typical one shot game in which there is a dilemma between individual rationality and aggregate 
outcome. We show that deviations from the Nash equilibrium outcome are compatible with the joint 
presence  in  the  sample  of  individually  rational,  team-rational,  (gift  giving),  “irrational”  and 
(opportunistic) “one-shot-cooperator” types. The two main factors affecting deviations from the 
standard individually rational behaviour are male gender and the interaction of generalised trust 
with the decision of meeting the counterpart in the VET design. 
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1. Introduction  
Evidence from laboratory experiments often provides findings which dispute the predictions of 
Nash Equilibrium, a central concept in game theory. In the context of social dilemmas cooperative 
outcomes emerge, while the Nash equilibrium prediction fails, not only in repeated games, but also 
in one-shot games (see, among others, Ladyard 1995; Goeree and Holt 2001; Camerer 2003)  
One  of  the  reasons  why  this  is  presumed  to  happen  is  the  implausibility  of  the  extreme 
rationality and self-interest assumptions in some of these contexts. Since its first appareance the 
Traveler’s  dilemma”  (Basu  1994), h as  been  accepted  as  one  of  the  best  examples  of  conflict 
between intuition and game-theoretic reasoning (Basu 1994, Capra et al. 1999).  
The parable associated with this game concerns two travellers returning from a remote island 
who lose their luggage containing the same type of souvenir because of the airline company. In 
order to be reimbursed, they have to write down on a piece of paper the value of the souvenir which 
may range between 2 and 100 (in the original Basu 1994 paper). If the travellers write a different 
number, they are reimbursed with the minimum amount declared. Moreover, a reward equal to 2 is 
paid to the traveller who declares the lower value, while a penalty of the same amount is paid by the 
traveller who writes the higher value. In case the two claims are exactly the same, the two travellers 
receive the declared value without reward or penalty. Given game characteristics, if both of them 
want to maximize their monetary payoffs, the (2,2) outcome is the only Nash equilibrium of the 
game and this is true independently of the size of the penalty or reward (hereafter also P|R).  
Basu  (1994)  rises  the  problem  of  the  implausibility  of  the  Nash  solution  (far  below  the 
(100,100) cooperative outcome) and suggests that a more plausible result is the one in which each 
player declares a large number, in the belief that the other does the same. Further contributions 
emphasize that the severity of the punishment has a role in determining the likelihood of the Nash 
equilibrium.  
These two issues have been empirically explored by different authors. Goeree and Holt (2001) 
run an experiment in which they show that the P|R size significantly affects subjects strategies. The   3 
P|R size also affects the Nash equilibrium result in repeated Traveller’s Dilemma (Capra et al. 
1999).  An  important  conclusion  in  the  literature  is  that  “the  Nash  equilibrium  provides  good 
predictions for high incentives (R = 80 and R = 50), but behavior is quite different from the Nash 
prediction under the treatments with low and intermediate values of R”. (Capra et al. 1999, p.680). 
The scarce predictive capacity of the Nash equilibrium is confirmed by Rubinstein (2007) showing 
that around 50 percent of more than 4.500 subjects who played the Traveller’s Dilemma (henceforth 
TD) online opted for the maximum choice (the minimum and maximum choice allowed were 180$ 
and 300$ respectively and P|R was 5$).
1 Rubinstein, by using response time data, concludes that in 
his experiment declaring 300$ (the largest number) can be interpreted as an instinctive (emotional) 
choice, while choices in the range 255-299 appear as the ones which imply the strongest cognitive 
effort.
2  
The present paper aims to shed light on the “stylised fact” of the failure of Nash equilibrium 
predictions in one-shot Traveller’s Dilemmas in an original way by: 
1. focusing on the effect of the reduction of social distance on such failure and on its influence 
on  the  relationship  between  players’  choice  and  their  beliefs  about  their  opponents’ 
strategy. In particular, we interpret the reduction of social distance in terms of removal of 
anonymity  after  the  experiment  (without  pre-play  communication
3)  and  we  distinguish 
between a treatment where a meeting at the end of the experiment between the two players 
in the same couple is a compulsory characteristic of the TD and a treatment where the 
meeting is a voluntary choice of players. 
2. interpreting deviations from the unique Nash equilibrium and its determinants in terms of 
the interplay of: i) standard individually rational players; ii) we-rational (or team) players; 
                                                 
1 Note that subjects who participated in the online experiment were not paid. However, Rubinstein stresses that the 
distribution of answers given by these subjects is similar to that of Goeree and Holt (2001) when they use the low P|R. 
2 From a theoretical point of view, in order to explain the evidence in one-shot Traveller’s Dilemma, Cabrera, Capra 
and Gomez (2004) proposed a model of introspection in which subjects are thought to trace through responses until a 
stopping rule is satisfied. The beliefs that generate response probabilities are degenerate distributions which put all the 
probability into a point and the response probability is based on the logit rule.   
3 On the effects of pre-play communication see, among others, Hoffman, McCabe and Smith (1996); Bohnet and Frey 
(1999); Buchan, Croson and Johnson (2000).   4 
iii) one-shot cooperators and iv) (gift giving) “irrational” players. More specifically, we 
investigate  the  relation  between  the  reduction  of  social  distance  and  the  probability  to 
observe players’ strategies associated with these types.  
The main result of the paper is that the voluntary decision to meet the other player significantly 
affects  the  probability  to  deviate  from  the  standard  individually  rational  behavior  when  it  is 
combined with a high level of generalized trust. By combining behaviour with declared values we 
therefore extend the literature on social distance by explicitly considering also the role of agents’ 
social orientation. 
In the second and third sections we illustrate the rationale of our experiment and describe its 
design.  In  the  fourth  and  fifth  sections  we  present  descriptive  and  econometric  findings 
respectively. The sixth section concludes.  
2. Traveller’s Dilemma and Reduction of Social Distance 
Our experiment is based on a two-player Traveller’s Dilemma in which each player is asked to 
choose a number between 20 and 200 and the P|R is equal to 20. We compare subjects’ choices 
under  three  treatments:  Baseline  Treatment  (BT),  Compulsory  Encounter  Treatment  (CET)  and 
Voluntary Encounter Treatment (VET). Each subject participates in only one treatment. In the BT 
subjects play the standard Traveler’s Dilemma. In the CET subjects play the game after having been 
informed that they would meet their counterpart at the end of the experiment (see Appendix 1 for 
the timing of the experiment). The meeting consists simply in the presentation of the two players 
after the game and does not involve any post-play activity. In the VET, before playing the game, 
subjects are asked to choose whether to meet or not their counterpart at the end of the experiment 
and are informed that the encounter takes place only if both the participants choose to meet the 
counterpart.  
The “lightness” of the meeting element with which we want to reduce social distance in our 
game has a precise rationale. In the spirit of many experimental studies, rigorous anonimity is   5 
preferred to test whether, even in those “limit social conditions”, players exhibit non standard social 
preferences. With a parallel approach we want to verify if the slightest reduction of social distance 
(ex post meeting of players who do not know each other) may change players’ behaviour with 
respect to the anonymity condition. 
According to our interpretation, the meeting reduces social distance among players and allows 
us to study the effect of this variable (by distinguishing when it is a compulsory and a voluntary 
characteristic of the game) both on the deviation from Nash equilibrium in the Traveller’s Dilemma 
and on the difference between choice and belief in the same context. This last point seems to be 
quite original with respect to the experiments based on the Traveller’s Dilemma which virtually did 
not pay attention to the relation between the decision of subjects and their belief declaration. On the 
contrary, we think that many interesting considerations may be deduced from the analysis of these 
data.  
Our empirical work may be considered part of that strand of the literature which finds that a 
reduction in social distance fosters cooperation in different situations: public good games (Bohnet 
and  Frey  1999),  dictator  games  (Hoffman,  McCabe  and  Smith  1996,  Bohnet  and  Frey  1999), 
prisoner’s dilemmas (Frohlich and Oppenheimer 1998) and trust games (Scharlemann et al. 2001). 
According to the literature, the effect depends on two main reasons. On the one side, the reduction 
of social distance promotes empathy among subjects (Bohnet and Frey 1999). On the other side, it 
allows for a social norm of cooperation or fairness to become effective (Roth 1995, Hoffman, 
McCabe and Smith 1996, Bohnet and Frey 1999). Furthermore, by comparing the effects of the 
reduction of social distance when it is voluntary and when it is compulsory, we are able to give to 
the theory of social distance an original interpretation based on the idea of relational goods.
 4 Only 
                                                 
4 Relational goods are intangible outputs of an affective and communicative nature that are produced through social 
interactions (Gui 2000). Examples of them are companionship, emotional support, social approval, solidarity, a sense of 
belonging and of experiencing one's history, the desire to be loved or recognized by others, etc. According to Gui 
(1987) and Ulhaner (1989), they are a specific kind of local public goods. They are public because, unlike conventional 
goods, they cannot be enjoyed by an isolated individual, but only jointly with some others.  They are local  public goods 
because the collective entity consuming them  is represented by a specific subset of agents in the economy. They are a 
specific kind of public goods, which should be better defined as anti-rival than as non rival, because their very same 
nature is based on the interpersonal sharing of them. This implies that participation to their consumption actually creates   6 
when the decision of meeting the counterpart is voluntary we may in fact talk of revealed taste for 
relational goods, while in the compulsory treatment we cannot infer anything about preferences of 
subjects who are forced to meet. With this respect, note that assuming nonzero opportunity cost of 
time, the decision of meeting the counterpart at the end of the game reveals that the player attaches 
a positive value to the encounter. 
We therefore test the idea that people with preferences for consumption of relational goods, 
which we associate with the voluntary decision to meet the other player, are more likely not to 
choose an opportunistic behaviour in the game in order to create a positive environment and to 
avoid a bad disposition in the other player which would reduce the probability to consume relational 
goods.
5  
3. Experimental Design and Procedure 
The experiment is based on a two-player Traveler’s Dilemma in which each player is asked to 
choose a number between 20 and 200.
6 Let us call n1 and n2 the numbers chosen by player 1 and 
player 2 respectively. Following the standard game rules, if n1 = n2, both players receive n1 tokens; 
if n1 > n2, player 1 receives n2-20 tokens and player 2 receives n2 +20 tokens; finally, if n1 < n2, 
player 2 receives n1+20 tokens and player 2 receives n1-20 tokens. The unique Nash equilibrium in 
pure strategies of this game is n1 = n2 =20.  
We  compare  subjects’  choices  in  three  treatments:  Baseline  Treatment  (BT),  Compulsory 
Encounter Treatment (CET) and Voluntary Encounter Treatment (VET). Each subject participates in 
only one treatment. In the BT subjects are divided in couples and instructed about the Traveler’s 
Dilemma. After reading the instructions and before subjects play the Traveler’s Dilemma, some 
control questions are asked in order to be sure that players understood the rules of the game. In the 
                                                                                                                                                                 
a positive externality on partners and contributes to the quality of the public good itself (Becchetti, Pelloni and Rossetti, 
2008).  
5 Notice that, in our case,  relational goods may vary from a minimum to a maximum content. The minimum content is 
just  the  desire  to  avoid  the  hostility  of  the  counterpart,  while  the  maximum  content  may  be  the  hope  to  build  a 
friendship with the other player starting from the small joint experience lived during the game. 
6 The instructions of the experiment are available from the authors upon request.   7 
CET, before playing the game, subjects are informed that they would meet their counterpart at the 
end of the experiment. The VET differs from the CET because in the former the meeting is a 
voluntary  choice  of  the  players.  In  the  VET,  after  being  instructed  about  the  game  but  before 
playing it, subjects are handed a form with the following question: “Do you want to meet, at the end 
of the experiment, the person you are going to play with?” They are informed of the fact that the 
meeting would take place only if both players replied with a “Yes”
7 For a more detailed description 
of the treatments see Appendix 1. 
In all the treatments, at the end of the game, beliefs about the opponent’s choice are elicited 
with a surprise question. In particular, each subject is asked to guess the number chosen by her 
opponent and she is paid 1 euro if the distance between her guess and their opponent’s actual choice 
is less then 10.
8 Finally, subjects are asked to answer a set of socio-demographic and attitudinal 
questions.  
The  experiment  was  run  both  at  the  Experimental  Economics  Laboratory  (EELAB)  of  the 
University  of  Milan  Bicocca  and  at  the  Laboratory  of  Experimental  Economics  (LES)  of  the 
University of Forlì
 9. We ran 2 sessions for the BT (1 in Milan and 1 in Forlì), 2 sessions for the 
CET (1 in Milan and 1 in Forlì), 3 sessions for the VET (1 in Milan and 2 in Forlì). A total of 140 
undergraduate students – 76 in Milan and 64 in Forlì – participated in the experiment. Players were 
given a show – up fee of 3 euro.  
4. Preliminary Evidence from Choice and Belief Distributions  
Distributions of belief (expected bid of the other player), choice and the difference between 
choice and belief provide rich information on sample characteristics (Figures 1-3). The first two 
                                                 
7 Subjects are informed about the other player decision at the end of the experiment. 
8 We believe that, in our kind of experiment, a prize exclusively given to the correct guess could be considered too 
difficult to achieve, thereby discouraging players and increasing the likelihood of casual answers. At the same time, 
eliciting procedures based on quadratic scoring rules (Davis and Holt 1993) are useless for a game - like our version of 
the Traveller’s Dilemma - characterized by a large number of possible strategies. The use of tolerance thresholds for 
subjects’  guesses  is  used  in  the  literature  as  a  valid  method  for  eliticing  beliefs  (see  for  example  Charness  and 
Dufwemberg 2006; Croson 2000). 
9 Subjects were recruited by email. They were students included in the mailing list of the two laboratories. Two weeks 
before the experiment they received an email in which the staff invited them to visit the Laboratory’s website for 
information about the experiment and subscriptions.   8 
distributions show, respectively, that only 2.14 percent of players play the NE outcome and only 
1.43 believe that the opponent will do the same. Consider, however, that the monetary prize for 
correct belief allows a +/- 10 tolerance. Players who believe in the opponent’s Nash rationality may 
strategically declare B 30 and still believe that the opponent will be Nash rational. Allowing for the 
possibility of “strategic” belief declaration (which exploits the +/-10 tolerance) we arrive to 4.29 
percent of beliefs compatible with NE. Even taking this into account, NE equilibria account for a 
very small part of our results. 
Figure 1 Players’ Choice 
 
 
Figure 2 Players’ Belief 
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Another piece of evidence which emerges just from the inspection of the choice and belief 
distributions is that one fourth of the players choose the highest bid (200) (Figure 1) and 17.86 
percent the highest belief (Figure 2).
10 These choices are incompatible with individual rationality. 
Strategic belief choice on the upper bound of the belief distribution is also important because we 
find an anomalous peak around the 190 play (40 percent of the sample).  
If we look at the distribution of the difference between choice and belief we find that only 18 
percent of players choose one unit below the belief, while around 12 percent of them are such that 
C>B+10 (Figure 3). These players are definitely “irrational” since, if they declare correctly their 
belief, or even if they play strategically on the +/-10 belief tolerance, they voluntarily decide to 
incur in the traveller’s game penalty. We enlarge the set of irrational players if we consider, more 
generally as such those for whom B 190
11 and C>B-1.
12 In such case that 33 percent of sample 




















                                                 
10 As also shown in the introduction, the result is, however, not so unusual in TD games when the penalty for choosing 
higher than the counterpart is low. Goeree and Holt (2001) find that, when the penalty is 5 (and the range between 180 
and 300), 80 percent of players chooses the highest bid. Cabrera Capra and Gomez (2006) find that the highest bid is the 
choice that occurs the most frequently when the range is between 20 and 120 and the penalty is equal to 5. Our penalty 
is however a bit larger (relative to the upper bound range) than in these two cases. 
11 We rule out all 190 choices since they may be strategic and do not allow us to understand whether players actually 
believe their opponent’s choice is 190 or more of it (up to 200). In this wider definition of irrational player we argue 
however that players with B>190 are not exploiting the +/-10 tolerance (they could have choosen B=190 to cover all 
higher expected bids) and therefore we believe in their expected bids. The distribution of the belief variables seems not 
to contradict this assumption since, after the anomalous peak of 190, we have only very few values higher than 190 and 
lower than 200. Consider also that there is no reason to behave stragically declaring something different from the true 
expected belief if (190>B>130). 
12 Actually, if the player is extremely confident in her point estimate of the counterpart choice, the individually rational 
behaviour should be C=B-1. Assuming however that the players have a non degenerate distribution of the expected 
counterpart choice and want to take extra caution, we include also C<B-1 among choices compatible with individual 
rationality.    10 




It is evident that an homogeneous population of Nash rational individuals, with or without 
Nash equilibrium being common knowledge, cannot explain these findings. In order to account for 
the observed variability in players’ combination of bids and beliefs, we therefore define in the next 
section a set of heterogeneous types and evaluate the predicted effects of the combinations of their 
possible matchings on bids and beliefs in the game. 
4.1 The definition of types and of predicted outcomes arising from their combinations. 
Let us define the following three types of players: 
1) Individually rational player: a player i is defined as individually rational (IRi) if Ci<Bi(j) or 
Ci =Bi(j) =  =  , where Bi(j) is the expectation of player i on the choice of her opponent j,  is the 
smallest number that a player can declare and   is the player’s belief that her opponent has 
declared the smallest number. 
The individually rational player maximises her payoff and therefore chooses at least one unit below 




















0  choice-belif + 10   11 
counterpart to play lowest and she does the same (Ci =Bi(j) =  =  ). Since the belief is not 
necessarily a point estimate but may be a distribution of expected choices, we choose a broader 
concept of individual rationality in which we include Ci Bi(j) – 1.
13  
ii) We-rational player: a player i is defined as we-rational (WRi) if Ci=Bi(j) when Bi(j) =  = 
or if Ci=B i(j) when B i(j)    
The literature has emphasized that, in some circumstances, individuals find themselves in situations 
in which it is rational to have team preferences (Hollis and Sugden 1993, Hollis 1998, Sugden 
2000).  According  to  Hollis  (1998)  we  need  “a  defensible  definition  of  reason  which  makes  it 
rational to trust rational people”. The difference between team directed preferences and the classic 
individual rationality is that the former lead to say: ‘It would be good for us if we did…’. If we 
adopt team preferences and we-rationality it is clear that the optimal choice is (200,200) and, if 
team preferences are common knowledge, each player opts for (C= , B= ). Consider also that, in 
the specific case of the Traveller’s Dilemma, we-rationality pays much more (10 times as much) at 
the individual and at the aggregate level! Hence the Traveller’s Dilemma is exactly one of 
those  circumstances  in  which  “individuals  find  themselves  in  situations  in  which  it  is 
rational to have team preferences”. 
iii)  One-shot-cooperator:  a  player  i  is  defined  as  (stategic)  one-shot-cooperator  (OSCi)  if 
Ci=Bi(j) when Bi(j) = =  or if Ci<Bi(j) when B i(j)  .    
In our definition the one shot cooperator is a self interested, individually rational player who tries to 
find an implicit agreement with the counterpart on a choice which maximises the interest of both. 
The reasoning of a one-shot-cooperator should be the following “I’m cool and I’m sure 
that my counterpart will be cool enough as well to understand that it is in our individual 
interest  that  we  both  choose  the  highest  play”.  If,  on  the  contrary,  she  believes  that  the 
                                                 
13 To understand this point immagine a car driver who drives on a one lane road and respects the rules. He knows that 
he needs extra care to take into account the possibility if crazy driver coming from the other direction that, when 
overtaking another car, enter his lane. The possibility of meeting this type of drivers will lead him to take a little bit 
extra care in driving.   12 
counterpart will not be smart enough to understand it without preplay communication, she will 
behave as a standard individually rational player and undercut the opponent (with Ci<Bi(j) ). 
Note  that,  when  Bi(j)=  ,  there  is  observational  equivalence  between  an  altruistically 
motivated form of we-rationality (I care also for the wellbeing of the other player in the 
same  way  I  do  for  mine  and  therefore  maximise  the  joint  outcome)  and  an 
opportunistically  motivated  form  of  one-shot-cooperation.  However,  when  Bi(j) ,  we 
have no more observational equivalence, the opportunistic cooperator will behave consistently with 
the pursuit of her individual interest and choose Ci<Bi(j). 
There is no contradiction between the two different behaviours of the one shot cooperator at 
Bi(j)=  and Bi(j)< . In the first case she will believe that the counterpart understand the implicit 
agreement and behaves cooperatively, while in the second she does not believe it, the implicit 
agreement is not enforced and therefore behaves non cooperatively. We may therefore interpret the 
one-shot cooperator behaviour in terms of full reciprocity (if I guess the other player trusts on me 
and there is an implicit agreement on the top bid I reciprocate, if I imagine that the other player does 
not rust on me and the agreement is not working I will undercut her). 
By considering these three types (individually rational, team rational, one shot cooperator) we 
obtain eight {choice, belief} outcomes according to different matches between types playing the 
game and their expectations on the counterpart type. 
a) {IRi,Ei[IRj]}  {Ci = , Bi(j)=  } 
If the player belongs to the individually rational type, and expects that the counterpart is of the same 
type,  we  have  the  NE  outcome.  The  outcome  of  this  case  coincides  with  that  in  which  Nash 
rationality is common knowledge. 
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b) {IRi,Ei[ IRj]}  {Ci < Bi(j)} 
If the player belongs to the individually rational type, and expects that the counterpart is not of the 
same type, she will play to undercut the opponent expected choice in order to win the prize and 
avoid the penalty.
14 
c) {WRi,Ei[WRj]}  {Ci =  , Bi(j)=  } 
If the player belongs to the we-rational type, and expects that the counterpart is of the same type, 
she will play highest under the expectation that the counterpart will do the same. 
d) {WRi,Ei[IRj]}  {Ci = Bi(j)} 
If the player belongs to the we-rational type, and expects that the counterpart is of the individually 
rational  type,  she  will  play  the  expected  choice  of  the  counterpart  without  undercutting  it, 
consistently with her goal to maximize the joint outcome. 
e) {WRi,Ei[OSCj]}  {Ci =  , Bi(j)=  }  
If  the  player  belongs  to  the  we-rational  type,  and  expects  that  the  counterpart  is  a  one  shot 
cooperator, she will play highest under the expectation that the counterpart will do the same. 
f) {OSCi,Ei[OSCj]}  {Ci =  , Bi(j)=  } 
If the player is a one shot cooperator, and expects that the counterpart is of the same type, she will 
consider  the  “implicit  agreement”  at  work  and  play  highest  under  the  expectation  that  the 
counterpart will do the same.  
g) {OSCi,Ei[IRj]}  { Ci = , Bi(j)=  } 
If the player is a one shot cooperator, and expects that the counterpart is of the individually rational 
type, she will play lowest under the expectation that the counterpart will do the same. 
h) {OSCi,Ei[WRj]}   {Ci =  , Bi(j)=  }  
                                                 
14See footnote 13 for the motivation of our decision not to restrict individual rationality to C=B-1.    14 
If the player is a one shot cooperator, and expects that the counterpart is a we-rational type, she will 
play highest under the expectation that the counterpart will do the same.  
Note that solutions from cases c), e), f) and h) are observationally equivalent and the same 
occurs  for  solutions  a)  and  g).  Solution  b)  includes  in  reality  several  possibilities  such  as 
{IRi,Ei[(WRj)]}, {IRi,Ei[ (OSCj)]} and also those in which the counterpart is expected not to have 
the capacity of understanding recursive rationality even not being a we-rational type or a one-shot-
cooperator. 
Note as well that our taxonomy left out an important part of players’ strategies. The situation 
in which Ci > Bi(j) is not compatible with our type definitions and will be considered for the moment 
as irrational. This implies in reality the existence of a fourth “irrational” type whose behaviour will 
be further qualified in the rest of the paper.
15  
Where do we find evidence of the existence of the above mentioned types? An indirect proof 
for their existence is provided by qualitative results from Becchetti, Basu and Stanca (2008) where 
players are asked at the end of the traveller’s game to declare in an open question what was the 
rationale of their choice. A large part of the answers can be classified under these three definitions. 
More specifically, in that paper the following examples of ex post rationalisation of players 
strategies may loosely
16 be attributed to one-shot cooperation: a) I made the most likely choice, 
hoping that also the other would have made the same instead of gambling; b) If all the players had 
chosen the maximum bid, we would all have obtained the maximum. I trusted the intelligence of 
others, who, according to me, were interested in getting the maxumum earnings, and opted for 200; 
c) I made my choice by believing that the other player was clever enough to cooperate but it was 
not true apparently since he behaved as it needed quick pocket money;d) I wanted to make the 
highest profit. The best choice in this perspective was the highest bid in all the four rounds. In this 
way, each participant would have obtained 20 ; e) The two players have to chose always 200 (the 
                                                 
15 We assume for simplicity that our three types rule out the possibility of meeting an irrational player.  
16 As we may expect declaration do not always coincide exactly with one type definition and may contain elements of 
more than one of them.   15 
maximum). Since 200 is given to both the players in this case, there are not penalties and it is a 
profitable choice; f) I like gambling and I made hazardous choices hoping that my colleagues in the 
games made the same. If both the players choose the highest bid the payoffs would be high for both; 
g) I decided to make high choices and slightly lower than 200 so that, if the lower choice made by 
the players is high, we both obtain a high enough payoff; h) I thought to the possible strategies of 
my counterpart and tryed to limit the loss, but always trusting the couterpart and, in particular, the 
fact that he could opt for high bids. 
By contrast, the following ex post rationalisations of players’ strategies are attributed by the 
authors to team preferences: a) I thought to the highest profit and the lowest loss of each player at 
each round;
17 b) You have to choose always 200, the maximum, this is the best strategy because the 
bid is obtained by both the players and there are not penalties;c) In certain cases I tried to choose 
the best choice for me, sometimes I opted for the best choice for both; d) I chose trying to maximize 
the earnings of both, according to the game theory, even though simetimes my choice was the 
dominated one; e) I made the choices which could, according to my opinion, generate the same 
earnings for my counterpart and me; f) My intention was to maximize the earnings of my 
counterpart and my earnings. 
Even though the analysis of these declarations makes clear that no perfect and univocal 
classification is possible, elements of we-rationality and one shot cooperation clearly emerge from 
them. More in detail, the classification of qualitative responses in the Basu, Becchetti and Stanca 
(2008) paper shows that “anomalous” preferences play an important role since one shot cooperator 
answers are around 12 percent, we-rational answers are 10 percent against 13 percent of answers 
inspired to individual rationality and 19 percent of them driven by risk aversion. Many other 
declarations remain of more difficult classification. 
Afer having defined types we verify the compatibility of the different choice, belief combinations, 
with our taxonomy (Table 1) .  
                                                 
17 Becchetti, Basu and Stanca (2008) considered a repeated Traveller’s Dilemma.   16 
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Table 1. Compatibility of players’ choice/belief combinations with predicted behaviour of our types 
Type of behaviour  Combination  of  {choice,belief} 
solutions  compatible  with  the 
defined types 






of  total 
sample 
Minimum bid    Ci =    3  2.14 
Maximum bid    Ci =    35  25 
NE  choice  and  NE  outcome  being  common  knowledge  (ruling  out 
strategic beliefs which exploit the +/- 10 tolerance) * according to the 
observed player beliefs  
{IRi,Ei[IRj]}, {OSCi,Ei[IRj]}  {Ci = , Bi(j)=  }  1  0.71 
We-rationality  or  one  shot  cooperation  being  common  knowledge 
(ruling  out  strategic  beliefs  which  exploit  the  +/-  10  tolerance) * * 




{Ci =  , Bi(j)=  }  15  10.71 
NE choice and NE outcome being common knowledge according to the 
observed player beliefs (including strategic beliefs which exploit the +/- 
10 tolerance) * 
{IRi,Ei[IRj]}  adjusted  for  the  +/- 
10 belief prize tolerance 
{Ci  =  ,  Bi(j)< 
+10+1}  
1  0.71 
We-rationality  being  common  knowledge  according  to  the  observed 





adjusted for the +/- 10 belief prize 
tolerance 
{Ci =  , Bi(j)>  -10-1}  33  23.6 
Individually  rational  behaviour  when  NE  outcome  is  not  common 
knowledge according to the observed player beliefs  
{IRi,Ei[ IRj]}  Ci<B i(j), Bi(j)>   51  36.4 
We-rational choice without team preferences being common knowledge 
when the player does not expect the counterpart to be a we-rational or 
one-shot cooperator type (ruling out strategic beliefs which exploit the 
+/- 10 tolerance) * 
{WRi,Ei[IRj]}  
 
Ci=B  i(j)  with  B  i(j)     190 
and Ci,<    
5  3.57 
“Irrational choice” (ruling out strategic belief which exploit the +/- 10 
tolerance) * 
  Ci>B i(j)  if B i(j)   190  27  19.29 
“Irrational choice”  (including strategic beliefs which exploit the +/-10 
tolerance) * 
  Ci>B i(j)  45  45.71 
* Given the possibility of getting the prize for the belief even in case of a +/- 10 error, we consider that strategic players may declare a belief of 30 even though their true belief is 
lower than 30 (for example it could be equal to 20). If players declare a belief lower than 30 they are not exploiting this opportunity and therefore we assume that their declared 
beliefs correspond to the true ones. ** Given the possibility of getting the prize for the belief even in case of a +/- 10 error, we consider that strategic players may declare a belief 
of 190 even though their true belief is higher than 190 (for example it could be equal to 200). If players declare a belief higher than 190 they are not exploiting this opportunity 
and therefore we assume that their declared beliefs correspond to the true ones.   18 
Table 2. Compatibility of players’ choice/belief combinations with predicted behaviour of our types (breakdown by experiment design) 
Type of behaviour  Combination  of 
{choice,belief}  solutions 
compatible with the defined 
types 












Minimum bid    Ci =    2.50  0  3.33  0  6.25 
Maximum bid    Ci =    27.50  30.00  20.00  25.00  15.63 
NE choice and NE outcome being common knowledge 
(ruling  out  strategic  beliefs  which  exploit  the  +/-  10 
tolerance) * according to the observed player beliefs  
{IRi,Ei[IRj]}; 
{OSCi,Ei[IRj]}, 
{Ci = , 
Bi(j)=  } 
0  0  1.67  0  3.13 
We-rationality or one shot cooperation being common 
knowledge  (ruling  out  strategic  beliefs  which  exploit 






{Ci  =  , 
Bi(j)=  } 
7.50  17.50  8.33  7.14  9.38 
NE choice and NE outcome being common knowledge 
according  to  the  observed  player  beliefs  (including 
strategic beliefs which exploit the +/- 10 tolerance) *  
{IRi,Ei[IRj]}  adjusted  for 
the  +/-  10  belief  prize 
tolerance 
{Ci  =  , 
Bi(j)< 
+10+1}  
0  0  1.67  0  3.13 
We-rationality being common knowledge according to 
the observed player beliefs (including strategic beliefs 





for  the  +/-  10  belief  prize 
tolerance 
{Ci  =  , 
Bi(j)>  -10-
1} 
27.50  30.00  16.67  17.86  27.50 
Individually  rational  behaviour  when  NE  outcome  is 
not  common  knowledge  according  to  the  observed 
player beliefs 
{IRi,Ei[ IRj]}  Ci<B  i(j), 
Bi(j)>  
35.00  35.00  38.33  35.71  40.63 
We-rational  choice  without  team  preferences  being 
common knowledge when the player does not expect 
the  counterpart  to  be  a  we-rational  or  one-shot 
cooperator  type  (ruling  out  strategic  belief  which 
exploit the +/- 10 tolerance) * 
{WRi,Ei[IRj]}  
 
Ci=B  i(j)  with 
B i(j)   190 and 
Ci,<    
2.50  0  6.67  10.71  3.31 
“Irrational  choice”  (ruling  out  strategic  belief  which 
exploit the +/- 10 tolerance) * 
  Ci>B  i(j)    if  B 
i(j)   190 
12.00  12.50  28.33  28.57  28.13 
“Irrational choice”  (including strategic beliefs which 
exploit the +/-10 tolerance) * 
  Ci>B i(j)  50.00  42.50  45.00  46.43  43.75 
* Given the possibility of getting the prize for the belief even in case of a +/- 10 error, we consider that strategic players may declare a belief of 190 even though their true belief 
is higher than 190 (for example it could be equal to 200). If players declare a belief higher than 190 they are not exploiting this opportunity and therefore we assume that their 
declared beliefs correspond to the true ones.   19 
We resume our main findings from Table 1 as follows: 
i)  individual rationality is much more widespread than NE outcome.  
The third line tells us that the belief/choice combination of only one player is consistent with NE 
outcome. The result does not change when we include strategic beliefs which exploit the +/- 10 
tolerance (Table 1, line 5). However, cases of individual rationality in which C<B are much more 
(36.4 percent of the sample) (Table 1, line 7). A large number of individuals behave accordingly to 
the  IR  type  but,  either  they  do  not  know  recursive  reasoning  or  they  do  not  believe  that  the 
counterpart knows or acts according to it.  
ii)  the  outcome  generated  by  (belief/choice)  combinations  assuming  couples  of  we-
rational  or  one-shot-cooperator  players  -    {OSCi,Ei[OSCj)]},  {OSCi,Ei[WRj)]}, 
{WRi,Ei[WRj)]} or {WRi,Ei[OSCj)]} – is more frequent than the NE outcome. 
The {Ci =  , Bi(j)=  } solution occurs in 10.71 percent of cases, against the 0.71 percent of the 
NE outcome. As explained in the previous section, the former is the observationally equivalent 
outcome of the four possible combinations of we-rational and one-shot-cooperator types. 
iii)  The undercutting choice prevails over the “pure” we-rationality choice when the 
expectation on the counterpart choice is not the upper bound one. 
For Bi(j)<  , we find that cases in which Ci<Bi (36.4 percent) are more than those in which Ci=Bi 
(3.57 percent). It seems that, outside the “implicit agreement” around the { i,   j} choice (point 
ii), individually rational behaviour dominates team rational one. The combination of findings ii) and 
iii) fits well with the definition of one-shot cooperators who behave differently whether they believe 
the “implicit agreement” on { i,   j} will be respected or not. 
iv)  There is a large share of “irrational” players who choose Ci>B i(j). 
The share of such players is 19.29 percent ruling out strategic beliefs which exploit the +/- 10 
tolerance (in this case we define as irrational players those who choose Ci>Bi(j)+10) and 45.71 
percent  if  we  include  strategic  beliefs.  Are  these  players  truly  irrational,  or  do  they  follow  a   20 
different  rationality?  We  will  answer  to  this  question  when  we  will  examine  the  effect  of  the 
different designs of the game to the distribution of types. 
In  Table  2  we  analyse  from  the  descriptive  point  of  view  the  relationship  between  the 
taxonomy of types conditional to the different treatments of the game. 
The most relevant differences are:  
i)  the rise of the{Ci =  , Bi(j)=  } belief/choice pair in the compulsory meeting treatment 
(17.5 percent against 7.5 in the baseline);  
ii)  the rise of the “irrational” behavior in the voluntary meeting design (line 9 in the table).  
On this point consider that those who want to meet their counterpart in the voluntary meeting 
treatment  have  on  average  a  choice  which  is  6.86  points  higher  than  their  belief.  This  is  a 
remarkable result considering that, as we expect, all the other subgroup means are negative (the 
choice is below the belief). More specifically, all the rest of the sample has a -5.40 average, the 
baseline group -5.85 and the compulsory treatment group -2.77.  
Let us define at this point a set of “gift givers” which is the sum of the irrational types (C>B) 
and of the team rational individuals who choose (C=B) when B< . By just looking at the ratio of 
gift givers on total players we find that we capture almost 44 percent of behaviour of players who 
want to meet the counterpart in the voluntary meeting design, 35 percent of those who do not want 
to meet the counterpart in the same scenario and 18 percent of players in both the baseline and 
compulsory meeting treatments. Gift giving seems therefore significantly affected by the treatment 
design. 
5. Econometric Findings  
The  commented  descriptive  findings  document  (as  in  previous  papers  of  this  literature) 
widespread deviations from individual rationality, call for the existence of heterogenous types and 
pose fundamental questions about factors which can explain such heterogeneity and the possible 
effects that changes in the experiment design may have on it.    21 
With respect to the effect of the three treatments on the likelihood of departure from individual 
rationality we formulate the following hypotheses:  
•  H1: the move from the BT to the CET design increases the likelihood of departure from the 
Nash rational behavior. 
•  H2: the move from the BT to the VET design increases the likelihood of departure from the 
Nash rational behaviour only for players who choose to meet the counterpart. 
While hypothesis 1 comes directly from the consideration that removal of anonymity should 
reduce  propension  to  opportunism  by  decreasing  social  distance,  hypothesis  2  concerns  the 
voluntary choice to meet the other player and it demands some considerations on the possible 
motivations behind the meeting’s decision. We have three explanations on the decision to meet the 
counterpart in the VET: 
1.  Curiosity. Consider the following utility function: U=X-wT, where X is the game payoff, T 
is  the  time  lost  in  case  of  meeting  and  w  the  opportunity  cost  of  time.  Suppose  that  a 
“curious players” obtains a positive utility from the satisfaction of her curiosity by meeting 
the counterpart. This kind of player will opt for the meeting in the VET only if the value of 
the meeting in terms of curiosity’s satisfaction compensates the opportunity cost of time lost. 
If this is the case, such players should depart from individual rationality because of the 
possibility of the reduction of social distance associated with the decision to meet the other 
player. 
2.  Desire to meet the other player in case one must pay the penalty in the game. It is the case of 
a player who wants to have the occasion to (negatively) reciprocate by manifesting her 
disappointment  during  the  meeting  in  case  she  has  to  pay  a  sanction  because  of  the 
counterpart’s declaration. The comparison between the meeting opportunity cost and the 
satisfaction associated with the possibility to reciprocate determines the decision to meet the 
counterpart. Also for these players the decision to meet the counterpart should increase the   22 
probability  to  deviate  from  the  individual  rationality  because  of  the  reduction  of  social 
distance. 
3.  Desire to meet the other player in order to have a good time with her. In this case, we define 
subjects who opt for the encounter as socially oriented subjects, by meaning that their utility 
function includes the enjoyable time spent with others. Let us define REL the relational 
goods which may be produced and consumed during a meeting. The utility function of a 
socially oriented player is U=aX-wT+bREL where X is the game payoff, T is the time lost in 
case of meeting and w the opportunity cost of time. We make three key assumptions related 
to this motivation to opt for the meeting. The first is that it applies only if players trust that 
also the counterpart is socially oriented. One may decide not to invest time in the encounter 
if she does not trust that the player she will meet is interested in consuming relational goods. 
The second assumption is that the value of the relational goods produced during the meeting 
positively depends on the dispositions of agents who meet
18. Finally we assume that players’ 
disposition towards the counterpart is affected by the result of the game. In particular, we 
assume  that  each  player  may  affect  other’s  disposition  by  playing  “generously”  in  the 
Traveler’s Dilemma, which means by trying to avoid that a sanction against the other player 
arises. Given these assumptions we may say that REL=f(C(B), GENTRUST) where REL 
depends on the choice in the game (C), given the belief in the other’s behaviour (B), and on 
the player’s level of generalised trust (GENTRUST) which incorporates her expectation on 
the other player in terms of social orientation. According to our opinion, generalized trust in 
others  may  approximate  players’  trust  that  the  counterpart  is a   social  oriented  subject. 
Socially oriented players whit high level of generalized trust should depart from individual 
                                                 
18 The value of relational goods depends on the characteristics of people sharing the goods (Sacco and Vanin 2000) and 
is increased by fellow feeling. With this respect, one could prefer to share time with people she trusts or she finds 
friendly. For this reason, the expected value of relational goods’ consumption depends on the disposition that agents 
have on the personal characteristics of people they are going to meet. A good disposition increases the probability that 
agents enjoy the encounter and, consequently, the quality of the relational good produced (and consumed) by it. On the 
contrary,  feelings  such  as  rancour  or  envy  can  interfere  with  their  production  (and,  consequently,  with  their 
consumption).   23 
rationality for two resons: because of the reduction of social distance and because of the 
willingness to create an agreeable atmosphere in the meeting. 
As a whole, we may rewrite our hipotheses: 
•  H1: the move from the BT to the CET design increases the likelihood of departure from 
the Nash rational behavior because of the reduction of social distance; 
•  H2A: the move from the BT to the VET design increases the likelihood of departure 
from the Nash rational behaviour for players who choose to meet the counterpart for 
curiosity because of the reduction of social distance; 
•  H2B: the move from the BT to the VET design increases the likelihood of departure 
from the Nash rational behaviour for players who choose to meet the counterpart in order 
to negatively reciprocate in case the counterpart behaves in a opportunistic way because 
of the reduction of social distance; 
•  H2C: the move from the BT to the VET design increases the likelihood of departure 
from the Nash rational behaviour for players who choose to meet the counterpart in order 
to consume relational goods both because of the reduction of social distance and because 
of the willingness to create an agreeable atmosphere in the meeting. 
Making reference to our four hypotheses, we perform non parametric rank tests on them. To do 
so we create a dependent variable which takes the value of one when C>B-1. By construction our 
dependent variable captures three behaviors different from individual rationality (team rationality if 
C=B, one shot cooperation if C=B=200 and “irrationality” when C>B). It may then be regarded as 
identifying departure from individual rationality.  
Table 3 clearly shows that the first three hypotheses (H1, H2A and H2B) are rejected since 
there is no significant difference in terms of departure from individual rationality between baseline 
and CET (H1) and between baseline and VET when we consider only players who simply opt for 
the encounter (notice that in our test we are not able to disentangle between curiosity and desire to 
negatively reciprocate). To test the fourth hypothesis we create a dummy which takes value of one   24 
when the player opts for meeting the counterpart in the VET and, at the same time, declares a level 
of generalized trust above median. In this case we find that hypothesis 4 is not rejected at 5% both 
when we perform the test on the overall sample and in the restricted sample of players participating 
to the VET  
Tab.3  
 
Hypothesis  Wilcoxon rank-sum test 
H1  z = 0.000 Prob > |z| =  1.000 
H2A and H2B  z = 0.06 Prob > |z| =  0.952 
H2C (control sample: the rest of participants to 
the voluntary meeting treatment) 
Z=-2.70 Prob > |z|=.005 
H2C (the rest of participants to the compulsory 
and voluntary treatments) 
Z=-2.54 Prob > |z|=.001 
H2C (the rest of the sample)  Z=-2.47 Prob > |z|=.013 
 
Two preliminary conclusions are: i) in the Traveller’s Dilemma the pure reduction of social 
distance does not seem to affect players’ strategy. It seems to be a pretty interesting result which 
generates a puzzle given the several contributions which show a significative role of the reduction 
of social distance on players’ decisions; ii) the reduction of social distance affects players’ strategy 
in the Traveller’s Dilemma only if players are characterized by social oriented preferences. 
In order to deeper investigate our second result, we conduct cconometric estimates which may 
add value to our analysis in two respects by: i) controlling for strategic belief declarations; ii) 
controlling  for  socio-demographic  factors  which  may  affect  our  between  subject  design;  iii) 
analysing the effects of the combination of generalised trust and willingness to meet the counterpart 
with a discrete and not a dicotomous (0/1) variable. 
We  therefore  regress  our  dependent  variable  (which  takes  the  value  of  one  when  C>B-1) 
measuring departures from individual rationality on the following controls: Vol-meeting (a dummy 
which takes value 1 if the subject plays the VET); Yes-meeting (a dummy which takes value 1 if the 
subject opts for the meeting in the VET treatment in which the option is available) and value 0 if the 
subject does not opt for the meeting in that treatment or participates in a different treatment); Male   25 
(a  gender  dummy  taking  the  value  of  one  if  the  subject  is  a  male);  Numexp  (the  number  of 
experiments to which the subject has already participated in the past); Baseline (a dummy which 
takes value 1 if the subject took part to the baseline treatment); Compuls-meeting  (a dummy which 
takes value 1 if the subject took part to the (CET) treatment in which the meeting is compulsory), 
Gentrust (the level of generalised trust declared by the player). We finally introduce a dummy 
(D190) which takes value 1 when the expected bid is 190, since we take into account that, in this 
case, the expected bid may be strategic (due to the +/- 10 tolerance of our reward on expected bid 
guess) and not coincident with the true one. 
We build two different specifications for our base model. In the first we include the level of 
generalised trust declared by the individual player
19 (Gentrust). In the second we introduce both the 
level  of  generalised  trust  and  an  interaction  variable  (Trustmeeting)  in  which  such  level  is 
multiplied  by  a  dummy  which  takes  the  value  of  one  if  the  individual  chooses  to  meet  the 
counterpart in the VET design and zero otherwise.  
The main results of the two tested specifications (Table 4) show that departure from individual 
rationality  is  significantly  and  positively  affected  by  gender  and  generalised  trust.  When  we 
introduce the interacted trustmeeting variable we find that the latter is strongly significant while the 
generalised trust regressors loose significance. These findings are consistent with non rejection of 
our fourth hypothesis. When looking at the magnitude of the significant coefficients we observe that 
the magnitude of the gender effect is not negligible and implies that male gender raises by 24 
percent probability of being we-rational. In the second specification, the marginal effect of the trust-
willingness to meet interaction variable is of around 14 percent. 
The gender result may appear unexpected. The literature on gender effects in experimental 
games is quite mixed, even though a partial consensus seems to exist on the fact that women tend to 
behave more socially in less risky situations (which does not contradict our finding given the risky 
                                                 
19 The question which measures the level of generalized trust is the usual one: “Generally speaking do you believe that 
others should be trusted?” Answers range is from 10 (highest level of trust) to 0.    26 
characteristic of the game).
20 Consider, however that, in our specific sample, when looking for 
gender differences in questionnaire variables we find that the only significant case is the reduced 
availability of women to lend money to friends.
21 Hence, women in our sample reveal to be less 
trustful  than  men.  A  potential  explanation  for  this  effect  is  that,  given  that  our  players  are  all 
students, we may expect that male players are significantly more willing to depart from individual 
rationality because they hope to meet a woman at the end of the encounter. This “flirting” rationale 
does not explain however the phenomenon since the gender effect remains significant if we limit 
the sample to the baseline treatment where there is full anonymity .
22 
In a robustness check we want to verify whether our findings remain significant when we 
reduce  the  variability  of  designs.  We  therefore  reestimate  the  three  specifications  ruling  out 
observations: i) from the compulsory meeting treatment; ii) from the baseline treatment and iii) 
including only observations from the voluntary meeting design (Tab. 5). Results are robust and 
confirmed under all of the three different reduced samples. When we eliminate CET observations 
we still have a significant gender effect (with a magnitude which gets larger up to 34 percent) and a 
significant  interaction  effect  between  generalised  trust  and  decision  to  meet  the  counterpart  (a 
magnitude of 17 percent). When we eliminate baseline observations both effects are significant with 
29 and 15 percent quantitative effects respectively. The final robustness check reduces the sample 
to observations from the VET treatment only. The two effects remain strongly significant and grow 
in magnitude (35 and 22 percent respectively). 
                                                 
20 Eckel and Grossman (2001) show that, in ultimatum games, there is no significant difference between women and 
men that play as proposer, while women reject less frequently when they play as responders. Solnick (2001) shows that 
both women and men expect higher offers by a female proposer and offer more to a male responder. Bolton, Katok and 
Zwick (1998) and Bohnet and Frey (1999) do not observe any gender effect in dictator games. In their experiment on 
third  party  punishment  Eckel  and  Grossman  (1996)  observe  that,  for  women,  the  frequency  of  punishment  is  a 
decreasing function of the cost of punishment. Andreoni and Vesterlund (2001) show that in a dictator game with  
asymmetric information men are more selfish. In his well known survey on public goods game experiments Ladyard 
(1995) concludes that there is not any significant difference between the choices of men and women. According to 
Eckel and Grossman (1998) women behave like men in more risky situations, like ultimatum games, but are more 
socially oriented in less risky situation, like dictator games (see also Eckel and Grossman, 2008 and Eckel, 2008). This 
is confirmed by Croson and Buchan’s (1999) experiment based on a trust game. They find that women behave like men 
when they play as trustor but they are more generous when play as trustee. Finally, Ortman and Tichy (1999) observe 
that in a repeated prisoner’s dilemma, women are more cooperative, but only in the first round. 
21 The non parametric Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) test identifies a significant gender difference in such 
direction (z= -2.081Prob > |z| = 0.038). 
22 Results are omitted and available from the author upon request.   27 
By considering our taxonomy of types, we must consider that our dependent variable does not 
rule out in absolute strategic behaviour. If the expected bid is 200 I may decide to play 200 because 
I’m a strategic one-shot cooperator. If we want to check whether our findings apply also excluding 
this possibility we have to remove observations in which B=200 from our estimates. We do that and 
find that results are substantially unchanged (Tab. 6). 
To  verify  what  is  behind  our  results,  we  look  at  correspondences  between  values  of  the 
Trustmeeting variable and the difference between choice and belief. A relevant descriptive result, 
which confirms our empirical findings, is that, for all players declaring a level of trust above median 
and choosing to meet in the VET, the difference between choice and belief is nonnegative. All of 
them therefore depart from the individually rational behaviour. 
5.1 Interpretation of econometric findings  
To interpret the significance of the Trustmeeting variable we consider that in the VET, by 
giving the possibility to meet the other player, we introduce in our experiment the possibility to 
consume relational goods through a personal interaction that agents will share after having played 
the game. Each player can affect the disposition that the counterpart has towards her by showing 
herself “generous (i.e. by trying to avoid the sanction against the other)”. A “generous” contribution 
reveals the willingness to create a cooperative relation with the other player and creates positive 
conditions for the production of relational goods after the game. On the social and economic point 
of  view,  such  contribution  entails  a  monetary  risk  for  the  player  which  may  traded  off  by 
nonmaterial benefits generated by the relational good consumed during the encounter.  
Another  important  issue  is  why  socially  oriented  attitudes  (gift  giving  or  team  rational 
behaviour) need to be related to the level of generalised trust. Our a priori (implied in hypothesis 
H2C) is that socially oriented individuals first formulate an assumption on whether counterparts can 
be socially oriented as well and, only if they deem so, decide to depart from individual rationality. 
The added value of the (generalised trust/willingness to meet) interacted variables may therefore be   28 
interpreted in two ways: the more I trust people, the more i) I expect that the counterpart will 
appreciate  my  gift  making  it  more  productive  in  terms  of  creation  of  a  positive  relational 
environment for the meeting; ii) I am confident on the complicity of the counterpart when I am 
team rational.
23  
A natural consideration which may arise is that, by allowing players to make a choice in the 
treatment, we depart from the random selection typical of experiments and introduce an element of 
selection bias. On this point consider that, given the specific focus of our paper (investigation of 
nature  and  causes  of  behaviours  different  from  individual  rationality),  we  are  not  specifically 
interested in the causality link between the departure from individual rationality and the design 
which reduces social distance and allows for the creation of relational goods. In other terms, it is not 
essential to know here whether the opportunity of the meeting creates the gift giving, or the team 
rational, behaviour in the player, or whether non individually rational types find an opportunity to 
express themselves due to the VET design. The core finding is that with this design we observe that 
a reduction of social distance associated with the desire to consume relational goods generates a 
reduction of the individually rational behaviour. Toghether with it we observe the association of 
generalised trust, willingness to meet the counterpart and the gift. 
Finally, even though in the trustmeeting variable we relate an experiment outcome to a variable 
measured in the ex post experiment survey, we feel confident that our finding does not depend from 
an ex post players rationalisation of their choices. Assume in fact that players with choices higher 
than expected bids or, more generally, players who depart from individual rationality, rationalise 
themselves ex post as people with very high level of generalised trust. In such case there should be 
a correlation between the two variables, irrespective of the treatment design. On the contrary, we 
find that the pairwise correlation is not significant and extremely small, in general (.06) in the two 
treatments without voluntary meeting.  
                                                 
23 Consider that the latter reasoning should be strictly applied when expected bids are very high. We however observe 
that the average belief of those who choose to meet the counterpart is not higher than that of the rest of the sample (with 
no significant relationship between the variable and the design). Furthermore, our results are robust when we rule out 
expected bids equal to 200 and therefore the possibility that departure from rationality is strategic.   29 
6. Conclusions  
Traveler’s Dilemma experiments have been run so far in a rigorously anonymous setting. Even 
though  the  logic  of  the  experiment  and  the  original  story  told  when  the  dilemma  was  first 
formulated  have  different  lifes,  it  is  nonetheless  worth  noting  that  the  imposed  anonymity 
characteristic contradicts the story. The two travellers located in different rooms by the airline 
company officier know each other very well, and will meet again after the bid. Even if they were 
game theorists and therefore the NE were common knowledge among them, lack of anonymity is a 
powerful  motivation  for  deviating  in  such  circumstances  from  the  NE  outcome.  It  is  therefore 
possible that they would bid high because they guess that the counterpart will do the same or 
because they do not want to create an embarassing unfriendly situation when they will soon meet 
again. Bringing this argument to a limit case, our assumption is that minimal departures from the 
anonymity assumption standardly assumed in TD experiments (and not fully correspondent with the 
story behind it) may contribute to trigger non Nash rational behaviour.  
To test our general proposition, we evaluate the effect of removal of anonymity with three 
different treatments: baseline (BT), compulsory meeting ex post (CET) and voluntary meeting ex 
post  (VET).  The  characteristics  of  our  two  last  original  designs  are  that  players  meet  ex  post 
without preplay communication or possibility to coordinate their strategies ex ante. The standard 
baseline  treatment  therefore  becomes  the  limit  case  of  lack  of  social  interaction  and  the  two 
modified treatments may be a framework which magnifies social norms which are also present, but 
less visibile, in the standard design when we observe deviations from individual rationality in it. As 
a  consequence,  pro-social,  team  rational  or  gift  giving  motivations,  eventually  emerged  in  the 
modified treatments, may also apply in smaller scale to the limit case of the baseline treatment if we 
assume that anonymity does not eliminate them completely. On the basis of our general proposition 
we  formulate  four  hypotheses  on  the  probability  to  deviate  from  the  individual  rationality  by 
considering the effect of the compulsory and voluntary encounter treatment and by distinguishing 
among the possible motivations behind the decision to meet the counterpart.   30 
After illustrating with our descriptive findings deviations from NE and individual rationality 
similar to those found in other works, we try to explain the paradox by defining a taxonomy of 
types  which  includes  “one-shot-cooperators”,  “individually  rational”,  “team-rational”  and, 
apparently,  “irrational”  (i.e.  players  who  declare  a  number  higher  than  their  belief  on  the 
counterpart) types.  
The main point we make here is that there are at least two different motivations (corresponding 
to two different types) to play the highest choice instead of the NE one.  
In the first the player aims to maximise the outcome of both players (the team) and not just her 
personal one. As in other social dilemmas, in the Traveller’s Game it is extremely convenient if 
both players are of the we-rational type. With our payoff structure the meeting of two we-rational 
types yields an output which is ten times higher than that which can be obtained when both players 
follow Nash rationality.  
The second type who may choose the highest bid is the one-shot cooperator. Such type does not 
care about the counterpart payoff as the we-rational individual does. She however thinks that, if the 
other player will be cool enough to choose the highest value, this will be good for both. The tiny 
difference between the two types is that the we-rational player sincerely cares for the counterpart 
payoff or dislikes payoff inequality. This is demonstrated concretely by the fact that, if her belief on 
the counterpart is below the maximum choice, she will choose the same and not a lower value to 
undercut the opponent.  
In  the  descriptive  statistics  part  of  the  paper  we  generally  observe  that  a  large  number  of 
couples of choice-beliefs are consistent with one-shot cooperation, team rationality or irrationality. 
With respect to the effect of the three treatments on the likelihood of departure from individual 
rationality we formulate four hypotheses and show that the fourth one is not rejected: only in the 
VET, and only for those who express high levels of generalised trust and the willigness to meet the 
counterpart, we observe significant departures from individual rationality.    31 
In the econometric part of the paper we control the robustness of this finding and confirm that, 
together with a male gender effect, the interaction of generalised trust and decision to meet the 
counterpart in the VET design affect positively and significantly the probability of departing from 
individual rationality and assuming a team rational or “irrational” (gift giving) attitude.  
In order to interpret this finding, we observe that, if we introduce preferences for relational 
goods,  we  may  easily  convert  again  the  “irrationality”  into  a  different  type  of  “gift  giving” 
rationality based on the popular knowledge saying that “you should never go bare handed into other 
people house”. Those who voluntarily choose to meet the counterpart may want to enjoy a relational 
good  and  try  to  create  an  agreeable  (avoid  a  disagreeable)  athmosphere  at  the  moment  of  the 
encounter. They know that such agreeability is function of the difference between their choice and 
the  choice  of  their  counterpart  (which  is  proxied  by  their  beliefs).  This  last  finding  is  more  a 
relational good than a removal from anonymity effect. In the second case, the difference between 
choice and belief should be significant also in the compulsory treatment dummy, while this is not 
the case. 
This interpretation helps to understand the significance of the interaction between decision to 
meet and generalised trust on the departure from individually rational behaviour. The more I trust 
on others, the more I expect that my gift will be appreciated and that the quality of the relational 
good created in the meeting will be high.  
Even though we do not obviously rule out the possibility of purely irrational or random plays, 
the lesson we can draw from our experiment is that heterogeneous behaviour need not to be termed 
as irrational since there are different forms of rationality with their inner logic. First, the adoption of 
we-rationality is the optimal adaptation of players to the characteristics of the game. Second, gift 
giving rationality may be an optimal way to maximise individual preferences which include social 
arguments. 
Further  research  in  this  direction  should  evaluate  how  these  conclusions  are  affected  by 
changes in the penalty or other elements of the game. It is reasonable to predict that higher penalties   32 
would  increase  the  tendency  toward  standard  NE  rational  behaviour  without  eliminating  the 
heterogeneity of types and their sensitiveness to changes in the experiment design (removal of 
anonymity, introduction of the possibility of consuming relational goods). 
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2  0.113  0.141 
Prob >  
2  0.004  0.001 
Number of obs.  139  139 
Legend: the dependent variable is a (0/1) dummy 
which takes the value of one when C>B-1 (C being 
the  player’s  bid  and  B  her  belief  on  the 
counterpart’s choice); Gentrust: agreement (from 1 
to  10)  on  the  following  statement:  “Generally 
speaking,  people  can  be  trusted”;  Yes-meeting: 
dummy which takes value 1 if the subject opts for 
the meeting in the (VET) treatment in which the 
option is available  and value 0 if the subject does 
not opt for the meeting in that treatment or if the 
subject  participates  in  a  different  treatment;  
Trustmeeting: gentrust*Yes-meeting; Male: gender 
dummy taking the value of one if the subject is a 
male; Numexp: Number of experiments the subject 
has  already  participated  in  the  past.  D190:  a 
dummy which takes value of 1 when the expected 
bid is 190; Baseline: dummy which takes value 1 
if the subject took part to the baseline treatment; 
Compuls-meeting: dummy which takes value 1 if 
the  subject  took  part  to  the  (CET)  treatment  in 
which  the  meeting  is  compulsory.  Vol-meeting: 
dummy which takes value 1 if the option of the 
meeting is available for individuals participating in 
the  experiment.  *  Significant  at  10%;  ** 
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%; Standard 
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Trustmeeting     0.789 
(0.349)
** 
  0.673 
(0.315)
** 
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2  0.181  0.232  0.094  0.139  0.170  0.285 
Prob >  
2  0.001  0.000  0.054  0.011  0.019  0.001 
Number of obs.  99  99  100  100  60  60 
Legend: the dependent variable is a (0/1) dummy which takes the value of one when C>B-1 (C being the 
player’s  bid  and  B  her  belief  on  the  counterpart’s  choice);  Gentrust:  agreement  (from  1  to  10)  on  the 
following statement: “Generally speaking, people can be trusted”; Yes-meeting: dummy which takes value 1 
if the subject opts for the meeting in the (VET) treatment in which the option is available  and value 0 if the 
subject does not opt for the meeting in that treatment or if the subject participates in a different treatment;  
Trustmeeting: gentrust*Yes-meeting; Male: gender dummy taking the value of one if the subject is a male; 
Numexp: Number of experiments the subject has already participated in the past. D190: a dummy which 
takes value of 1 when the expected bid is 190; Baseline: dummy which takes value 1 if the subject took part 
to the baseline treatment; Compuls-meeting: dummy which takes value 1 if the subject took part to the (CET) 
treatment in which the meeting is compulsory. Vol-meeting: dummy which takes value 1 if the option of the 
meeting is available for individuals participating in the experiment. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 
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Trustmeeting     0.674 
(0.355)
* 
  0.799 
(0.417)
* 
  0.785 
(0.356)
** 





































































































































2  0.141  0.173  0.264  0.306  0.090  0.150  0.174  0.279 
Prob >  
2  0.004  0.001  0.000  0.000  0.136  0.023  0.026  0.002 
Number  of 
obs. 
114  114  86  86  82  82  54  54 
Legend: the dependent variable is a (0/1) dummy which takes the value of one when C>B-1 (C being the player’s bid and B 
her  belief  on  the  counterpart’s  choice);  Gentrust:  agreement  (from  1  to  10)  on  the  following  statement:  “Generally 
speaking, people can be trusted”; Yes-meeting: dummy which takes value 1 if the subject opts for the meeting in the (VET) 
treatment in which the option is available  and value 0 if the subject does not opt for the meeting in that treatment or if the 
subject participates in a different treatment;  Trustmeeting: gentrust*Yes-meeting; Male: gender dummy taking the value of 
one if the subject is a male; Numexp: Number of experiments the subject has already participated in the past. D190: a 
dummy which takes value of 1 when the expected bid is 190; Baseline: dummy which takes value 1 if the subject took part 
to the baseline treatment; Compuls-meeting: dummy which takes value 1 if the subject took part to the (CET) treatment in 
which the meeting is compulsory. Vol-meeting: dummy which takes value 1 if the option of the meeting is available for 
individuals participating in the experiment. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%; Standard 
errors in brackets. 
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APPENDIX 1 - Timing of the experiment  
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